HM Sultan Muedzul-Lail T Kiram sends his very best wishes for a prosperous and successful New Year 2013 to all Defenders of the Philippine Sabah Claim...

Photo of the Consecration of HM Sultan Muedzul Lail T Kiram, 35th Sultan of Sulu and North Borneo (Sabah) in September 2012 in Maimbung, Sulu, seat of the Sultanate of Sulu and North Borneo (Sabah); shown in the picture together with HRH Pangian Mellany S. Kiram.

Consecration of HM Muedzul-Lail Tan Kiram, 35th Sultan of Sulu and North Borneo (Sabah)

The Consecration in September 2012 in Maimbung, Sulu of HM Muedzul-Lail Tan Kiram, 35th Sultan of Sulu and North Borneo (Sabah), shown in the picture together with HRH Pangian Mellany S. Kiram.

It would be easy to negotiate with Tausug warrior Nur Misuari

AT THE END OF THE DAY, NUR MISUARI CAN BE A 'SOFTIE'... NO! NO! That's not meant to malign the MNLF founder and legendary Tausug warrior but merely to say that he is human and appreciates, like many of us, respect and a minimum of courtesy. 

That was actually my reaction after reading a news report in today's Freeman that said, "The stance of Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) founding chairman Nur Misuari against the framework agreement may soon soften as a result of the Aquino administration's "talks" with the leader of the former rebel group."

It reminded me of a story that no less than current DND Secretary Voltz Gazmin likes to tell, that of the 1986 historic meeting between the late President Cory Aquino and the legenderary warrior -- or an incident just before the meeting, when she broke protocol and flew to Sulu to sue for peace with the MNLF. Voltz Gazmin, who was then CG, Presidential Security Group, tells the story often enough to highlight the courageous streak in the late president but which also gave us an insight into Misuari's innate Tausug character.

Voltz Gazmin recounted that the event was due to take place right in MNLF lair and as commanding general of the presidential security command, he was naturally apprehensive for the security of the chief executive. The life of the president was in his hands. He remarked that the president felt almost no fear and trusted that she would be able to achieve what she had set out to do. But he did not trust the MNLF, Misuari or not Misuari, to get anywhere near the president especially in Sulu where he would be severely outnumbered if things went wrong. But one thing he did say was that from the onset of the meeting between Cory and Misuari, the Tausug rebel exuded a very courteous demeanour towards the president, almost humble, perhaps, honoured and impressed that the president, a woman to boot, would have the courage to show up in "enemy country."

After a brief courteous exchanges, and just as the serious part of the discussions was about to begin, Mrs Aquino did the most unexpected thing -- which had not been planned at all; she ordered everyone out of the conference room except for a note taker. She decided that she was going to speak to Nur Misuari one-on-one. Voltz was naturally caught off guard. He was adamant that he did not want to leave the president alone with the rebel Tausug Misuari and insisted to be present with the president. But the president refused Gazmin's remonstrances. She was determined that they should be left alone to discuss the proecess of peace. She tried to reassure the PSG chief that everything would be alright and ordered him to leave.

With his heart trepidating, he left and waited outside the conference room. After nearly an hour, the president called for staff and the commander of the PSG. Alongside a meek-looking Nur Misuari, the president announced that they had come to an agreement to go forward to settle matters towards peace. According to Gazmin, he was left speechless. He saw Nur Misuari almost appearing like a lamb, acting with great deference to the president, in other words, respectful.

Cory Aquino left an indelible image of courage and fortitude in General Voltz Gazmin. But unknown to him, he left me personally with the appreciation that Nur Misuari, despite the rhetorics, is a reasonable man, a fierce but also gentle Tausug warrior. And that was what the MNLF commander was like when I finally met him for the first time back in the 90s. 

At the end of the day, negotiating for the much abused 'just and lasting peace' with the 'Moros' may just be possible through Nur Misuari. All it would take is to give him the respect he and his people deserves. 

By Anne de Bretagne
For The Philippine Sabah Claim Forum
24 October 2012

DECLASSIFIED U.S. STATE DEPT NOTES PROVIDE INSIGHT INTO WHY PH HAD TO GO IT ALONE ON SABAH CLAIM BACK IN THE 60s

DECLASSIFIED U.S. STATE DEPT NOTES PROVIDE INSIGHT INTO WHY PH HAD TO GO IT ALONE ON SABAH CLAIM BACK IN THE 60s 

From the Archives Re: Sabah

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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968
VOLUME XXVI, INDONESIA; MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE; PHILIPPINES, DOCUMENT 367

367. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1

Washington, May 20, 1968.

SUBJECT
The Sabah Dispute and ASEAN
Discussion:
As you will recall, at the luncheon May 9, Foreign Minister Thanat raised the question of the Philippine-Malaysian dispute over Sabah and his concern that the dispute may disrupt the ASEAN ministerial meeting in August. Thanat plans to reason with both parties before the bilateral talks on Sabah open in Bangkok June 17. He would like us to persuade President Marcos to cool off the quarrel. We did not at the time so inform Thanat, but we have told the Filipinos informally, when they mentioned the issue, that we thought they should quiet the matter. (See Manila 8618 and State 136076 attached at Tab B.)2

After giving the matter further thought, and discussing it with the Country Directors in EA, I believe that we should continue to avoid active intervention in the Sabah dispute, and to avoid initiating discussions on this issue with any of the interested governments. In arriving at this conclusion, I considered the following points:

(1) Seriousness of Present Impasse—We expect the Bangkok talks on Sabah to fail, with mutual recriminations. Malaysia intends to reject the Philippine claim outright and to refuse a second round of talks, even if (according to one senior Malaysian official) the Philippines react by breaking diplomatic relations again. The Malaysians also plan to stage a military demonstration in Sabah while the bilateral talks are going on. On the Philippine side, President Marcos is reported to have reversed the moderate line urged by Foreign Secretary Ramos, and the Department of Foreign Affairs is now taking a “second hard look” at the relative priorities of regional cooperation and the Sabah claim.

(2) Sabah as a Southeast Asian Problem—We have told both the Filipinos and the Malaysians that we consider Sabah primarily a problem which they will have to work out for themselves. Other members of ASEAN, working separately or jointly, may be able to help them work out a face-saving compromise, or to persuade them at least to try to contain the dispute in order to minimize the damage to regional cooperation. I believe that advice or pressure from outside powers, however well-intended, would only weaken the sense of responsibility of ASEAN members for handling their own affairs, and that at this point, we can best encourage the development of ASEAN by standing aside and letting the member states decide for themselves how to deal with the potential threat posed by the Sabah dispute.

(3) U.S.-Philippine Relations and Philippines in Southeast Asia—I believe that it would be unwise especially for the U.S. to attempt to guide or influence the Philippines on this issue. Such a move would encourage the Filipinos' tendency to draw us into their affairs and then to consider us responsible for the situation. It would also reinforce the view held by other Southeast Asian nations that the Philippine Government cannot be dealt with as a responsible Government, but must be approached through Uncle Sam, who will keep them in line. If the Philippines is to play a responsible role in Southeast Asian affairs, Fililpino leaders must learn to conduct their affairs without guidance from us, and to bear the consequences of their mistakes.

The attached telegram (Tab A)3 would instruct Bangkok to follow up the luncheon conversation of May 9 with Thanat with a fuller discussion of the Sabah issue, and to outline an appropriate portion of the reasoning I have given above. Other addressees would be authorized to draw on the message in discussions with interested officials, but not to raise the Sabah question independently.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached telegram to Bangkok concerning the Sabah dispute.

1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 18 MALAYSIA. Secret. Drafted by Ruth A. McLendon (EA/PHL) and cleared by EA, EA/PHL and in draft with EA/IND, EA/MS, EA/TB, and EA/RA.

2 Both attached but neither printed.

3 The draft telegram is attached, but is not printed. According to a handwritten note, Rusk approved its transmission and it was sent on May 21 at 12:30 p.m.

(NB: Credit to Yolanda Ortega Stern for the Philippine Sabah Claim Forum for the research.)

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My thoughts off the cuff:

I have come across some similar documents -- declassified State Dept documents but not as clear as this. I suppose these notes were written during the SEATO meeting in Bangok (Lyndon Johnson was there)

WE WERE "SOLD"! What makes me think that the Sabah claim was "sold"? Because of this portion in the State Dept report: "(3) U.S.-Philippine Relations and Philippines in Southeast Asia—I believe that it would be unwise especially for the U.S. to attempt to guide or influence the Philippines on this issue. Such a move would encourage the Filipinos' tendency to draw us into their affairs and then to consider us responsible for the situation. It would also reinforce the view held by other Southeast Asian nations that the Philippine Government cannot be dealt with as a responsible Government, but must be approached through Uncle Sam, who will keep them in line. If the Philippines is to play a responsible role in Southeast Asian affairs, Fililpino leaders must learn to conduct their affairs without guidance from us, and to bear the consequences of their mistakes."

"Fililpino leaders must learn to conduct their affairs without guidance from us" but at the same time, the US always expected us to toe the line when it came to their desiderata. Extraordinary! They really wanted us on leash -- to bark when they said so and to heel at command and at the same time, we were expected to 'act independently.' Simply simply extraordinary! 

This how-to-handle-the-Philippines policy'must have been the same stand since 1963 when the Philippines filed a protest with the UN about the planned Malaysia Federation incorporating Sabah and Sarawak. We did not received any backing for our protest with the UN from our American allies. There's been no evidence that they did. 

My question has now been half answered, i.e., "Why did not the Americans want to help us pursue the Sabah claim?" My most generous thought is that they couldn't be bothered -- but that's only part of the answer... There is a tactical or perhaps, more serious strategical reason and that's what I would like to find out. I say this because Britain helped their former colony Malaya Federation (which is now Malaysia Federation following the 1963 annexation of Sabah and Sarawak) -- America could have done the same for us. Really they could have. 

At the same time, the State Dept or the CIA must have been aware of the Marcos preparations for Oplan Merdeka, the first physical attempt by the Philippines to re-take North Borneo or Sabah, a plan that he had begun to put up in earnest in 1967 or a year before this note was released...

They [the Americans] could not have ignored that... Were they just simply turning a blind eye but at the same time knew that they would step in and stop Marcos one way or the other if he went ahead and carried with his plans to "invade" Sabah?

A relative of mine who had been a legal adviser to one of the presidents and who later on became defence undersecretary for another Philippine president had informed me that in early 1968, the US had agreed to transfer vessels to the Philippines which the US knew  -- no way they wouldn't have known because they were already aware of Oplan Merdeka somehow -- would be used to ferry troops across Sabah... At the last minute when Jabidah Massacre was exposed, the vessels were turned back and sailed back to Vietnam.

These are not conjenctures. They were events that happened prior to the failed Philippine re-taking of Sabah or the denunciation of the covert operation made famous by media as the Jabidah Massacre. But the big question remains: Why did America not support our Sabah claim bid?  

By Anne de Bretagne
For the Philippine Sabah Claim Forum
and For the Defenders of the Philippine Sabah and Spratly Claims
26 Sept 2012

In picture: US Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the man who sealed the fate of the Philippine Sabah claim.