The Taiwan Straits Crisis – A Hair’s Breadth from Annihilation

The Taiwan Straits Crisis – A Hair’s Breadth from Annihilation

Sixty years have come and gone, but the sun has yet to set on the Taiwan Straits Crisis. Stranded on the rocky island of secrecy amid the storms of the Cold War (1947-1991), the mists of time should not be permitted to veil the lessons that must be learned.  In the U.S. during the early 1950s, Eisenhower was in office, China was engaged in a civil war, the Soviets were antsy, and the Air Force longed to hear the words  ‘the pickle is hot’ indicating they were free to unload armaments. The only thing missing from the high-tension plot was a bevy of brilliant beauties unless, of course, you consider Madam Chiang Kai-shek and Hedy Lamar.

Like a fine dining experience, the Taiwan Straits crisis unfolds in courses paired with the appropriate drink. In the late 1920s, China engaged in a great civil war. Following the final gasp of the Qing Dynasty in 1917, China was an unwieldy briar patch. From the political vacuum of swirling cultures and societal chaos coupled with the sheer size of the country, two primary competing forces emerged; Mao Tse-tung who would be at the helm of the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) with a Communist agenda and Chiang Kai-Shek (ROC) who would lead the forces that did not want communism.

http://coldwarwarrior.com/2013/08/02/the-taiwan-straits-crisis-a-hairs-breadth-from-annihilation/

China arms unified coast guard agency to handle sea conflict

 China arms unified coast guard agency to handle sea conflict

China is bent on showing the international community that it has indisputable jurisdiction over the waters over which China claims ownership.
China is now arming a united coast guard agency to prove its jurisdiction over the disputed waters.
China’s new unified coast guard agency has gone into operation, state media reported Tuesday amid maritime disputes with neighbors, and experts said more ships will be armed as a result.
The China Coast Guard integrates the functions of marine surveillance, the existing coast guard which came under the police, fisheries law enforcement and Customs’ anti-smuggling maritime police.
The divisions “that were not allowed to be equipped with weapons can be armed now,” Yang Mian, professor of international relations at the Communication University of China, was quoted as saying by the Global Times newspaper.
“The new agency will also make our law enforcement more powerful.” The new agency will “have reasonable and legal law enforcement equipment” and “detect and rapidly handle in accordance with the law acts that harm China’s maritime rights and interests”, Zhang Junshe, a military researcher, wrote in a commentary in the PLA Daily.

Tensions have been growing over China’s island disputes with Japan and other neighbors.
Chinese surveillance ships have frequently approached disputed islands in the East China Sea, which Japan controls and knows as the Senkakus but which China claims as the Diaoyus, after Tokyo nationalized some of them last September.
The Philippines and Vietnam have accused Beijing of aggressively asserting its extensive claims in the South China Sea, although tensions have abated slightly with Hanoi in recent weeks.
With an eye on the rows, the United States has strengthened military cooperation with Japan and the Philippines — which are both treaty-bound allies — as well as with former war adversary Vietnam.

http://www.tribune.net.ph/index.php/headlines/item/17062-china-arms-unified-coast-guard-agency-to-handle-sea-conflict

Manila, Washington widen talks for military deal

Manila, Washington widen talks for military deal

MANILA (Reuters) - Washington and Manila have expanded talks on military cooperation to include possible U.S. funding to build facilities and the storage of U.S. humanitarian relief supplies, the Philippine envoy to the United States said on Tuesday.

The wider scope of the talks for joint use of civilian and military facilities signals rapidly warming security ties between the allies as the Philippines looks to the U.S. administration to help counter a newly assertive China.

The Philippines has ruled out granting permanent basing rights to Washington, Ambassador Jose Cuisia said, but it would give U.S. warplanes and warships wider access to Philippine bases on a temporary and rotational basis, helping the Asian nation improve its minimum defence capability.

The increasing rotational presence of U.S. forces in the country is covered by the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement, but a new arrangement would be needed if Washington built facilities to support its temporary deployment to the Philippines.

"We need to expand (the 1998 pact) further because we may have to build some additional facilities," Cuisia told reporters in the Philippine capital.

The two countries have been in talks since 2011 for "joint use" of civilian and military facilities in the former U.S. colony.

http://news.yahoo.com/manila-washington-widen-talks-military-deal-082344483.html

Classic example of American deception: 1899 Bates Treaty with Sultanate of Sulu

From: American Conflicts

General John Bates signed the Bates Treaty
with the Sultan of Sulu. (Photo credits: WikiCommons)

The Bates Treaty of 1899 was a classic example of American deception and use of treaties in deceptive ways. If the intent of colonization of the Philippines was “by God’s grace to do the very best by them” as indicated by President McKinley, the Bates Treaty was an unusual way to achieve this. The Treaty grants some degree of autonomy and protection to the Sulu Sultanate which effectively kept them out of the Philippines-American War.

However, once the war ended, the terms of the Bates Treaty were broken and the United States moved to bring the Moro territories under American military control. These actions lead to the Moro War.

– Grayspirit’s Abstract and Commentary

Text: Bates Treaty of 1899 

Conditional Agreement Between Brig. General John C. Bates, Representing the United States, and the Sultan of Jolo (Sulu), August 20, 1899

Between Brigadier-General John C. Bates, representing the United States, of the one part; and his Highness, the Sultan of Jolo, the Dato Rajah Muda, the Dato Attik, The Dato Calbi, and the Dato Joakanain, of the other part: it being understood that this agreement will be in full force only when approved by the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and confirmed by the President of the United States, and will be subject to future modifications by the mutual consent of the parties in interest. 

Article I. The sovereignty of the United States over the whole Archipelago of Jolo, and its dependencies, is declared and acknowledged. 

Article II. The United States flag will be used in the Archipelago of Jolo, and its dependencies, on land and sea. 

Article III. The rights and dignities of His Highness the Sultan, and his Datos, shall be fully respected; the Moros are not to be interfered with on account of their religion; all religious customs are to be respected, and no one is to be persecuted on account of his religion. 

Article IV. While the United States government may occupy and control such points in the Archipelago of Jolo as the public interests demand, encroachment will not be made upon the lands immediately about the residence of His Highness the Sultan, unless military necessity requires such occupation in case of war with a foreign power; and, where the property of individuals is taken, due compensation will be made in each case. 

Any person can purchase land in the Archipelago of Jolo and hold the same by obtaining the consent of the Sultan and coming to satisfactory agreement with the owner of the land, and such purchase shall immediately be registered in the proper office of the United States Government. 

Article V. All trade in domestic products of the Arrchipelago of Jolo, when carried on by the Sultan and his people with any part of the Philippine Islands, and when conducted under the American flag, shall be free, unlimited, and undutiable. 

Article VI. The Sultan of Jolo shall be allowed to communicate direct with the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands in making complaint against the Commanding Officer of Jolo or against any Naval Commander. 

Article VII. The introduction of firearms and war material is forbidden, except under specific authority of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. 

Article VIII. Piracy must be suppressed and the Sultan and his Datos agree to heartily cooperate with the United States authorities to that end, and to make every possible effort to arrest and bring to justice all persons engaged in piracy. 

Article IX. Where crimes and offenses are committed by Moros against Moros, the government of the Sultan will bring to trial and punishment the criminals and offenders, who will be delivered to the government of the Sultan by the United States authorities if in their possession. In all other cases persons charged with crimes or offenses will be delivered to the United States authorities for trial and punishment. 

Article X. Any slave in the Archipelago of Jolo shall have the right to purchase freedom by paying to the master the usual market value. 

Article XI. In case of any trouble with subjects of the Sultan, the American authorities in the islands will be instructed to make careful investigation before resorting to harsh measures, as in most cases serious trouble can thus be avoided. 

Article XII. At present, American or foreigners wishing to go into the country should state their wishes to the Moro authorities and ask for an escort, but it is hoped that this will become unnecessary as we know each other better. 

Article XIII. The United States will give full protection to the Sultan and his subjects in case any foreign nation should attempt to impose upon them. 

Article XIV. The United States will not sell the island of Jolo or any other island of the Jolo Archipelago to any foreign nation without the consent of the Sultan of Jolo. 

Article XV. The United States government will pay the following monthly salaries: To the Sultan $250.00 (Mexican dollars) To Dato Rajah Muda $ 75.00 To Dato Attik $ 60.00 To Dato Calbi $ 75.00 To Dato Joakanain $ 75.00 To Dato Amin Hussin $ 60.00 To Dato Puyo $ 60.00 To Hadji Butu $ 50.00 To Hadji Mura $ 10.00 To Serif Saguin $ 15.00 

Signed in triplicate, in English and Sulu, at Jolo, this 20th day of August, A.D. 1899 (13 Arabmil Ahil 1317). 

(Signed) John C. Bates, Brigadier General, United States Volunteers 

(Signed) Hadji Mohammed Jamalol Kiram Sultan of Jolo 

(Signed) Datu Rajah Muda Datu Attik Datu Kalbi Datu Joakanain

DECLASSIFIED U.S. STATE DEPT NOTES PROVIDE INSIGHT INTO WHY PH HAD TO GO IT ALONE ON SABAH CLAIM BACK IN THE 60s

DECLASSIFIED U.S. STATE DEPT NOTES PROVIDE INSIGHT INTO WHY PH HAD TO GO IT ALONE ON SABAH CLAIM BACK IN THE 60s 

From the Archives Re: Sabah

Doc List No. Prev Next

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968
VOLUME XXVI, INDONESIA; MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE; PHILIPPINES, DOCUMENT 367

367. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1

Washington, May 20, 1968.

SUBJECT
The Sabah Dispute and ASEAN
Discussion:
As you will recall, at the luncheon May 9, Foreign Minister Thanat raised the question of the Philippine-Malaysian dispute over Sabah and his concern that the dispute may disrupt the ASEAN ministerial meeting in August. Thanat plans to reason with both parties before the bilateral talks on Sabah open in Bangkok June 17. He would like us to persuade President Marcos to cool off the quarrel. We did not at the time so inform Thanat, but we have told the Filipinos informally, when they mentioned the issue, that we thought they should quiet the matter. (See Manila 8618 and State 136076 attached at Tab B.)2

After giving the matter further thought, and discussing it with the Country Directors in EA, I believe that we should continue to avoid active intervention in the Sabah dispute, and to avoid initiating discussions on this issue with any of the interested governments. In arriving at this conclusion, I considered the following points:

(1) Seriousness of Present Impasse—We expect the Bangkok talks on Sabah to fail, with mutual recriminations. Malaysia intends to reject the Philippine claim outright and to refuse a second round of talks, even if (according to one senior Malaysian official) the Philippines react by breaking diplomatic relations again. The Malaysians also plan to stage a military demonstration in Sabah while the bilateral talks are going on. On the Philippine side, President Marcos is reported to have reversed the moderate line urged by Foreign Secretary Ramos, and the Department of Foreign Affairs is now taking a “second hard look” at the relative priorities of regional cooperation and the Sabah claim.

(2) Sabah as a Southeast Asian Problem—We have told both the Filipinos and the Malaysians that we consider Sabah primarily a problem which they will have to work out for themselves. Other members of ASEAN, working separately or jointly, may be able to help them work out a face-saving compromise, or to persuade them at least to try to contain the dispute in order to minimize the damage to regional cooperation. I believe that advice or pressure from outside powers, however well-intended, would only weaken the sense of responsibility of ASEAN members for handling their own affairs, and that at this point, we can best encourage the development of ASEAN by standing aside and letting the member states decide for themselves how to deal with the potential threat posed by the Sabah dispute.

(3) U.S.-Philippine Relations and Philippines in Southeast Asia—I believe that it would be unwise especially for the U.S. to attempt to guide or influence the Philippines on this issue. Such a move would encourage the Filipinos' tendency to draw us into their affairs and then to consider us responsible for the situation. It would also reinforce the view held by other Southeast Asian nations that the Philippine Government cannot be dealt with as a responsible Government, but must be approached through Uncle Sam, who will keep them in line. If the Philippines is to play a responsible role in Southeast Asian affairs, Fililpino leaders must learn to conduct their affairs without guidance from us, and to bear the consequences of their mistakes.

The attached telegram (Tab A)3 would instruct Bangkok to follow up the luncheon conversation of May 9 with Thanat with a fuller discussion of the Sabah issue, and to outline an appropriate portion of the reasoning I have given above. Other addressees would be authorized to draw on the message in discussions with interested officials, but not to raise the Sabah question independently.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached telegram to Bangkok concerning the Sabah dispute.

1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 18 MALAYSIA. Secret. Drafted by Ruth A. McLendon (EA/PHL) and cleared by EA, EA/PHL and in draft with EA/IND, EA/MS, EA/TB, and EA/RA.

2 Both attached but neither printed.

3 The draft telegram is attached, but is not printed. According to a handwritten note, Rusk approved its transmission and it was sent on May 21 at 12:30 p.m.

(NB: Credit to Yolanda Ortega Stern for the Philippine Sabah Claim Forum for the research.)

------------------------------------------------------

My thoughts off the cuff:

I have come across some similar documents -- declassified State Dept documents but not as clear as this. I suppose these notes were written during the SEATO meeting in Bangok (Lyndon Johnson was there)

WE WERE "SOLD"! What makes me think that the Sabah claim was "sold"? Because of this portion in the State Dept report: "(3) U.S.-Philippine Relations and Philippines in Southeast Asia—I believe that it would be unwise especially for the U.S. to attempt to guide or influence the Philippines on this issue. Such a move would encourage the Filipinos' tendency to draw us into their affairs and then to consider us responsible for the situation. It would also reinforce the view held by other Southeast Asian nations that the Philippine Government cannot be dealt with as a responsible Government, but must be approached through Uncle Sam, who will keep them in line. If the Philippines is to play a responsible role in Southeast Asian affairs, Fililpino leaders must learn to conduct their affairs without guidance from us, and to bear the consequences of their mistakes."

"Fililpino leaders must learn to conduct their affairs without guidance from us" but at the same time, the US always expected us to toe the line when it came to their desiderata. Extraordinary! They really wanted us on leash -- to bark when they said so and to heel at command and at the same time, we were expected to 'act independently.' Simply simply extraordinary! 

This how-to-handle-the-Philippines policy'must have been the same stand since 1963 when the Philippines filed a protest with the UN about the planned Malaysia Federation incorporating Sabah and Sarawak. We did not received any backing for our protest with the UN from our American allies. There's been no evidence that they did. 

My question has now been half answered, i.e., "Why did not the Americans want to help us pursue the Sabah claim?" My most generous thought is that they couldn't be bothered -- but that's only part of the answer... There is a tactical or perhaps, more serious strategical reason and that's what I would like to find out. I say this because Britain helped their former colony Malaya Federation (which is now Malaysia Federation following the 1963 annexation of Sabah and Sarawak) -- America could have done the same for us. Really they could have. 

At the same time, the State Dept or the CIA must have been aware of the Marcos preparations for Oplan Merdeka, the first physical attempt by the Philippines to re-take North Borneo or Sabah, a plan that he had begun to put up in earnest in 1967 or a year before this note was released...

They [the Americans] could not have ignored that... Were they just simply turning a blind eye but at the same time knew that they would step in and stop Marcos one way or the other if he went ahead and carried with his plans to "invade" Sabah?

A relative of mine who had been a legal adviser to one of the presidents and who later on became defence undersecretary for another Philippine president had informed me that in early 1968, the US had agreed to transfer vessels to the Philippines which the US knew  -- no way they wouldn't have known because they were already aware of Oplan Merdeka somehow -- would be used to ferry troops across Sabah... At the last minute when Jabidah Massacre was exposed, the vessels were turned back and sailed back to Vietnam.

These are not conjenctures. They were events that happened prior to the failed Philippine re-taking of Sabah or the denunciation of the covert operation made famous by media as the Jabidah Massacre. But the big question remains: Why did America not support our Sabah claim bid?  

By Anne de Bretagne
For the Philippine Sabah Claim Forum
and For the Defenders of the Philippine Sabah and Spratly Claims
26 Sept 2012

In picture: US Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the man who sealed the fate of the Philippine Sabah claim.

Fifty years ago, Philippines filed claim to Sabah

PHILIPPINE SABAH CLAIM FORUM DATES AND EVENTS TO REMEMBER IN RELATION TO NATION'S SABAH CLAIM

By Anne de Bretagne
10 June 2012
For the Philippine Sabah Claim Forum

FIFTY YEARS AGO OR ON 22 JUNE 1962 MORE PRECISELY: PHILIPPINES FILED OFFICIAL CLAIM TO SABAH BUT PHILIPPINES FAILED TO OBTAIN SUPPORT FROM ITS FORMER COLONIAL MASTER TURNED MAJOR ALLY, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

The Malayans (not yet Malaysians) under Tunku Abdul Rahman, on the other hand, not only had the full support of Great Britain, its former overlords and then key ally but it also appeared that they had received blanket approval to annex Sabah from then United Nations Secretary General U Thant (undoubtedly through the largesse and political pressure by then superpower and Malaya colonials Great Britain.)

The question that comes to mind is why did not the United States of America give the Philippines support in its bid to establish its sovereignty rights over Sabah in 1962 or even during the 60s while the claim was clearly a hot item in the United Nations? The United States which was Philippine colonial master and at the time of the claim was filed was the Philippines' great  'benefactor.' The US, was, after al, a superpower in its own right and could have exerted influence on the United Nations and why not on Great Britain, its major ally and friend with whom it has a 'special' relationship? What happened that the United States decided not to intervene on behalf of the Philippines?

Dates and events to remember related to events surrounding the Philippine Sabah claim:

31 August 1957: Federation of Malaya (not yet MALAYSIA) was established on the Malay Peninsula thus giving the former British colony its political independence, while Britain kept Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei, and British North Borneo (Sabah) outside the federation.

12 May 1961: Malay prime minister Tunku Abdul Rahman set about the formation of the Federation of Malaysia (successor to Federation of Malaya) —the political union of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah. The proposal was noted to have been well received in Peninsular MALAYA and Singapore but it was also noted that it was not popular in the three Borneo territories (which included Sabah) which stood to be annexed in the planned Federation of Malaysia.

May 1962: Senator Jovito Salonga treatise on "THE NORTH BORNEO QUESTION" and published in  Manila Times, Manila Chronicle, Philippines Free Press

22 June 1962: Philippines under President Diosdado Macapagal filed official claim to Sabah as successor in interest and formally opposed the planned annexation of Sabah by then Federation of Malaya and Great Britain from whom Peninsular Malaya had become independent.

12 September 1962 (and not on 11 September as claimed by some fake sultan and impostor prince claiming to be representing Sultanate of Sulu): official and formal transfer of sovereignty rights over Sabah to the Republic of the Philippines by Sultanate of Sulu through Sultan Esmail Kiram, legal and moral owners of Sabah.

January 1963: President Sukarno began a low-intensity conflict with Malaya known as Konfrontasi to prevent the annexation of Sarawak which Indonesia claimed as part of the Indonesian territory.

16 September 1963: Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore were annexed to Federation of MALAYA to create the Federation of MALAYSIA. Philippines and the newly formed Federation of Malaysia severed diplomatic ties.

*In picture: President Diosdado Macapagal aboard USS Oklahoma in 1962.